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Attack graphs are models that offer significant capabilities to analyse security in network systems. An 
attack graph allows the representation of vulnerabilities, exploits and conditions for each attack in a single 
unifying model.  This paper proposes a methodology to explore the graph using a genetic algorithm (GA). 
Each attack path is considered as an independent attack scenario from the source of attack to the target. 
Many such paths form the individuals in the evolutionary GA solution. The population-based strategy of a 
GA provides a natural way of exploring a large number of possible attack paths to find the paths that are 
most important. Thus unlike many other optimisation solutions a range of solutions can be presented to a 








The need for security risk decision support models has become essential for a lot of organisations 
as well as network systems. Many network administrators and security analysts mostly rely on 
their skills and expertise rather than looking at objective metrics to support and justify the 
decision-making process. This paper aims to develop and provide a risk assessment framework 
that supports the process of making such decisions.  
 
Security risk assessment is an essential process for managing risks in information systems for 
several reasons [1]: firstly, it helps organisations to quantify risks in their information systems. 
For example, risk assessment can produce numerical metrics that directly relate to monetary value 
for a specific threat or overall threat. Attack graph-based risk assessment can quantify risk for a 
single attack path from the source of attack to the target. It can calculate the likelihood of the 
attacker exploiting the target of attack as well as the impact as expected losses. Secondly, it 
supports decision makers to see and understand what risks their organisations may face. This 
helps decision makers to determine and make actions on risks which may be accepted, removed 
or mitigated. To illustrate this using attack graph-based risk assessment: the risks of all or some 
attack paths in the attack graph can be calculated so that decision makers can easily see what are 
the most and the least risky attack paths. Lastly, the attack graph evaluates control effectiveness 
after being implemented. For example, attack graph-based risk assessment can calculate the total 
loss in the whole attack graph before deploying controls and after deploying controls to determine 
the security saving of the organisation. 
 
Risk Assessment methods can be classified as qualitative or quantitative [1]. Qualitative risk 
assessment produces descriptive estimates for risk such as “low,” “medium” and “high.” They are 
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mostly based on traditional methods such as questionnaires, interviews and brainstorming etc. 
These methods are mainly used when organisations cannot estimate the likelihood and impact of 
threats. The methods have some drawbacks when being applied to very large complex network 
security environments [2]. On the other hand, quantitative risk assessment methods usually use 
predefined formulas and mathematical expressions to produce numeric estimates for risk, often 
measured in monetary value. According to a recent review paper on risk analysis methods in IT 
systems, most of the articles reviewed used quantitative risk methods [3]. In particular, 
quantitative methods are preferred in organisations which are able to provide estimates in numeric 
numbers for the probability and loss associated with each attack.  
 
Although risk assessment is widely used to measure enterprise networks, it still cannot help 
organisations and decision makers in identifying, controlling and mitigating risks. According to 
Ou and Singhal, security risk analysis of networks faces some challenges [4]: first, managing the 
network security with hundreds of hosts and different operating systems and applications is 
difficult. Second, protecting the networks and critical systems from new evolving multi-step and 
multi-host attacks is tremendously hard. Last, detecting and preventing attacks using traditional 
detection methods is often not successful due to the complexity of attacks.  
  
According to Gibson one of the most important steps for a risk management plan is to define the 
objectives [1]. These objectives are the indicators that show whether a risk management plan is 
successfully implemented or not. Gibson pointed out some common objectives for a risk 
management plan including: a list of threats, a cost-benefit analysis and security control costs.  
Many security decision support models are proposed or developed as a multi-objective problem, 
while others are developed as a single-objective problem. Developing a multi-objective risk 
assessment model can allow decision makers to consider a trade-off between objectives. Whereas, 
a single-objective risk assessment model usually gives decision makers a clear value for a single 
goal. 
 
In this paper, we propose a quantitative attack graph-based risk assessment model to quantify the 
risks of attack paths in the attack graph. The risks of attack paths are calculated from the 
probabilities and expected losses associated with each vertex in the attack graph. The probability 
of vulnerability exploitation are considered as a numeric percentage taken from an expert 
knowledge database such as the  Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)[5][6]. The 
expected loss is quantified in monetary terms.  
 
The contribution of this paper is to develop a genetic algorithm approach to quantify the risk of 
attack paths in attack graphs. A population-based strategy is proposed to be a particularly useful 
approach as in an attack graph there are a very large number of possible paths. A single point 
optimisation strategy could be used to find the single most likely, or single most high-risk path. 
However, this may hide other very likely paths that might expose a risk. We use a quantitative 
metric towards single point optimisation goal, for example the highest risk of individual attack 
path, but the nature of a GA means that there will be many individuals available for final analysis. 
Thus a solution presented to the user will include many high-risk paths.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses related works. In Section 3, we define an 
attack graph and provide examples of attack graphs and attack paths. Genetic algorithms are 
briefly explained in Section 3. Section 4 describes and explains the proposed security risk 
assessment model that includes vulnerabilities, attack likelihoods, expected losses and risks. 
Section 5 describes the proposed solution using a GA approach, which is then discussed using 
example experimental results Section 6. 
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2. RELATED WORKS 
 
There are many works on security risk assessment which has its roots in general risk and failure 
analysis. An early work in risk assessment of computer systems is proposed by [7]. and presents a 
model to measure risks in networked systems. It defines the risk as the probability of 
consequences multiplied by the loss. It describes an optimisation approach to determine the best 
set of patched software running on a computer to minimise the risk. The work concluded that all 
software must be patched to reduce the risk. One shortcoming of this work is that it did not 
capture dependencies between exploits in terms of pre-conditions and post-conditions for network 
administrators to fully understand and properly analyse exploits. In this paper, we base the risk 
assessment model is on  dependency attack graphs that represent the dependencies, relations and 
transition states between network configurations, vulnerabilities and exploits as attack paths. 
Other security risk assessment models combine an attack graph with Bayesian networks [8] [9] 
[10] [11]. For example, Poolsappasit et al. developed a risk assessment model called a Bayesian 
attack graph [9]. The aim of the model is to assess security risk outcomes by calculating the 
expected loss and gain associated with every attribute in the Bayesian attack graph. However, this 
implicitly makes the assumption that the attacker has already compromised all states in the whole 
attack graph.  In real-world scenarios, attackers do not necessary exploit all machines or 
vulnerabilities in a network (i.e. all states in the attack graph). In this paper, we calculate the risk 
of a range of attack graphs and present a range of the most and other highly risky attack paths.  
Measuring security risks using attack graphs has been discussed in several works [11] [12] [13]. 
Noel and Jajodia developed a metric to measure the overall security of network systems [11]. In 
practice, the metric quantifies the risk through measuring the likelihood of an attacker 
compromising attack paths. The attack graph used in the work combines the exploits in attack 
paths with the initial condition. The authors assume that an attacker may start with a path and then 
follow another path. Therefore, both attack paths are measured in the metric. The model 
associates each network configuration with an implementation cost and reduces risk (expected 
loss from breach) by a certain amount. Lastly, the model finds the configurations that minimise 
the overall costs. Although this work has the capability to quantitatively analyse and optimise 
small attack graphs, it is challenging to use the technique to handle large graphs with thousands of 
network configurations. In this paper, we develop a genetic algorithm approach to handle very 
large graphs with thousands of vertices and edges. 
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
3.1. Attack Graphs 
 
Risk assessment requires an organisation to provide information about security threats. To be able 
to provide such information, the organisation should have a way or tool to represent and analyse 
security attacks. Attack graphs represent the combination of: hosts, network configurations, 
vulnerabilities and exploits to describe the possible known security attacks. In particular, 
Dependency Attack Graphs, as used in this paper, have the capabilities to show attack scenarios 
and paths between a source state and target state. Each vertex in a dependency attack graph 
represents a condition state of system settings, while the edge represents the casual relation 
between those system conditions [14] [15].  Each state in the dependency attack graph can be 
associated with numerical numbers to estimate the expected loss or the likelihood of the state 
being satisfied. 
 
Definition 1: A dependency attack graph can be specified as a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E, 
P, L) where V is a set of vertices that represent pre-conditions, vulnerabilities and exploits and E 
is a set of edges (arcs) that represent relationships between the pre-conditions, vulnerabilities 
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and exploits. There is a probability Pi associated with each vertex that represents the likelihood 
of an attacker exploiting a vulnerability without considering the pre-conditions. There is an 
expected loss Li associated with each vertex that represents the loss value in monetary units when 
the vertex has been exploited.   
 
Definition 2: The incoming edge(s) of a vertex v from one or more vertices W⊂ V  represents a 
dependency relationship such that the condition represented by v is dependent upon on W. Where 
v depends upon every condition in W then v is said to be an AND vertex; where v requires only 
one condition from W then v is said to be an OR vertex. The vertices in W are said to be parents 
of v. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a very small attack graph to aid the description of the model, later realistic 
examples are too large to show the full picture. In this attack graph, the target of an attacker 
“vertex 1” depends upon some combination of the other vertices. In Figure 1, an AND vertex is 
represented by an ellipse and an OR is represented by a diamond. Thus vertex 1 can be exploited 
by either or both of the exploits represented by vertices 2 or 3. However, vertex 4 requires both 
vertices 6 and 7 as a joint pre-condition. Vertices 6, 7 and 8 are called LEAF vertices representing 
either a network configuration (e.g. an open port) or an existing vulnerability.    
 
In the example of Figure 1 there are two ways that an attacker can reach the target: either with 
1346 AND 7 or 1257 AND 8. While we may talk about a path a more accurate 
description would be to describe them as a tree and thus we define. 
 
Definition 3: A minimal attack tree T⊂ G is an attack tree defined by a set M ⊂  V vertices and a 
set N ⊂ E edges. The attack tree starts with a set L ∈ M LEAF vertices denoted as the source 
vertices of the attack, such that the in-degree of l ∈ L is 0 and ends with a target vertex t ∈ M as 
the target of attack, such that the out-degree of the target vertex t is 0. Each OR vertex has only 
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Figure 1. Attack tree example 
 
Thus in the example shown in Figure 1, the node set {1,3,5,7,8} represents one minimal attack 
tree and the set {1,2,5,7,8} represents the other possible minimal attack tree.  
 
3.2 Genetic Algorithms 
 
The concept of genetic algorithms was first introduced by Holland and his student Kenneth [16] 
[17]. The genetic algorithm encodes a specific problem on a chromosome-like data structure. It 
applies genetic operators to explore the solution space and produce potential solutions. The GA 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.6, No.3, May 2014 
35 
typically has: a population of chromosomes, selected according to fitness; crossover to produce 
new offspring population; and, mutation of new offspring. 
 
In our risk assessment model, we use the GA approach for several reasons: first, the GA produces 
populations of solutions not just a single solution, an operator is rarely interested in a single attack 
vector at attackers may choose many paths (or trees in out representation); second, it is highly 
suited to NP-complete problems such as searching through many promising attack paths/trees; 
lastly, the GA can encode many objectives and calculate a large range of possible risk values so 
that they can be used for decision making. 
 
4. PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL  
 
This paper describes the risk assessment framework shown in Figure 2. First, Attack graph 
generation scans the network using a network scanner i.e. Nessus [18] and then generates 
dependency attack graphs using MulVAL [19]. Next, likelihood determination assigns a 
probability to each vertex. Third, loss estimation quantifies loss for each vertex. Later, risk 
determination calculates the risk associated with vertex. Fifth, GA optimisation calculates the risk 














Figure 2. Risk assessment and optimisation framework 
 
4.1 Likelihood Determination  
 
Most risk assessment models contain at least the probability of attack or threat. In the previous 
section, we describe three types of vertices in the attack graph. One of the types is the Leaf vertex 
that represents an existing vulnerability, a network configuration or condition. We assign the 
probability of vulnerability to leaf vertices according to the CVSS scores [5] [6]. The main 
purpose of CVSS is to provide an open source framework for the characteristics and impacts of IT 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it has been widely used to derive probabilities of vulnerabilities. Each 
CVSS score addresses three areas of concerns termed [6]: base, temporal and environmental. 
Each metric produces a numeric number in scale of (1 to 10). The base group provides quantities 
of vulnerability. The temporal group reflects the characteristics of vulnerability that change over 
time. The environmental group describes a specific vulnerability that is unique to any user’s 
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environment. CVSS is used in this paper because it offers standardised vulnerability scores. The 
scores cover all software and hardware platforms. 
 
Leaf vertices representing network configurations, or conditions, are assigned a probability of 1.0 
because they are always assumed to be true. For example, a network configuration can be an open 
TCP port 80. To assign a probability to this condition only makes sense in the context that it is 
either true or false: if the TCP port 80 is open, it indicates a probability of 1.0; else, the TCP port 
80 is not open indicating the probability of 0.   
 
AND vertices representing MulVAL rules are assigned scores according to the MulVAL 
Reasoning System [19]. OR vertices representing exploits are assigned probabilities according to 
the incoming vertices. 
 
4.2 Loss Estimation  
 
Loss estimation has always been a challenge in quantitative risk assessment often due to the lack 
of internal or external data [1]. The loss estimation value assesses the loss when an attack actually 
occurs. For instance, a web server running many services for an enterprise company is 
unavailable for a day, the company will have a severe impact because the business services 
cannot be provided any more. At this point, estimating the loss may include the hourly revenue of 
business, loss of data and implementing a mitigation plan. There are a few types of loss that 
companies experience as a results of a security breach [20]: 
 
• Productivity loss is the time, e.g. hours or days, that a service or application is not 
available. For example, the downtime lost due a security attack and therefore the loss can 
be estimated as the average hourly revenue of the system or service multiplied by the 
number of hours that the system is unavailable. 
• Data loss is the corruption, copying or unauthorised access of data. For instance, data loss 
happens in the event of unauthorised access to sensitive data of an enterprise company. 
The loss estimation can be the value of money the company will pay to recover the 
sensitive data. 
• Business loss is concerned with the reputational impact. An example is that the customers 
of a business many no longer use the business because of highly data breach. In this case, 
it is difficult to quantify the loss due to several factors such as publicity and severity of 
security breach. However, estimates can be made from looking at similar examples and 
the impacts they cased through loss of custom or share values changes.  
 
The estimation of loss in our work is quantified as one monetary value which should include all 
types of losses. In this work, determining accurate loss estimates remains a key issue, but we aim 
to develop a genetic risk assessment model that can be applied to any organisation. To 
successfully apply the model, the organisation is the only one that can produce accurate loss 
estimates.  Each enterprise has its own organisational architecture, operational procedures, 
services and assets. In this case, the enterprise CEO and system administrators are the only people 
who are able to produce some estimations of losses. Therefore, for evaluation of techniques, it is 
common to produce loss estimates using theoretical aspects such as statistical distributions, which 
can be used to simulate real data. Operational Risk Management research has investigated the risk 
of directed and indirect losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and 
systems, or from external events such as security breaches. Several research studies [21] [22] [23] 
[24], have reported that the lognormal distribution is often the best to fit the severity distribution 
of the monetary loss data, and this distribution is used in this work.  
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It is shown in Figure 1 that the attack graph has three types of vertices “AND, OR, LEAF”, where 
the OR vertex represents an exploit. In this work, OR vertices are associated with lognormal 
distributed values to represent loss; an OR vertex does not represent any loss unless an exploit 
occurs i.e. when an OR vertex is satisfied in the attack graph. However, AND/LEAF vertices are 
associated with zero losses because they do not indicate any direct attack or exploited threat but 




The risk is represented as the product of the cumulative probability of a vertex v and the expected 
loss. 
 
Definition 4: The risk function of a vertex v ∈ V is defined as the product of the cumulative 




where P(v) is the cumulative probability that represents the likelihood that a vulnerability 
associated with vertex is exploited. L(v)is the expected loss in monetary value associated with a 
vertex v if vertex v is exploited.  
 













5. PROPOSED GENETIC ALGORITHM 
 
Algorithm 1 describes a high level view of the proposed GA methodology for attack graph-based 
risk assessment and optimisation. The optimisation aim of the GA is to find the highest risk 
minimal attack tree. It should be noted that although this is the optimisation target of the GA, the 
aim of the whole process is to find a population of high-risk paths. The inputs are the attack graph 
G which consists of vertices V, edges E, probabilities P and losses L. The attack path is a set of 
vertices that represents an attack scenario from the source to the target of the attack. The 
probabilities associated with each vertex in the attack path is actually the probability of vertex 
being satisfied. Similarly, the expected losses associated to each vertex in the attack path is the 
actual loss in monetary value if the vertex is exploited.    
 
The GA works as the following: In step 1, the GA randomly generates an initial population  .  
with the given size α. Each individual member, as shown in Figure 1, is an integer number that 
represents the vertex’s ID and indicates whether this vertex is actually included in the attack path 
or not. Step 2 evaluates each individual in the population  and then initialises a list of 
BestSolutions in step 3. Step 4 begins the main while loop of the GA which continues until the 
stopping condition is met i.e. the best solution does not improve within 200 generations. Steps 5-
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11 repeat to produce offspring and stops when the number of offspring is equal to α. Step 6 
randomly selects a pair of parents for reproduction. Step 7 performs the crossover process based 
on the rate of crossover γ. Step 8 performs the mutation process based on the rate of mutation µ. 
Step 9 evaluates the produced offspring by computing its fitness. Step 10 adds the produced 
offspring to the offspring population . Step 11 updates the BestSolutions by checking if the  
 
Figure 3. Pseudo-code of proposed GA 
 
produced offspring is better than other best solutions. Step 12 preforms the population 
replacement by combining the current population  and the offspring population  but keeping 
the fittest individuals for the next generation. 
 
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
 
6.1 Network Configuration 
 
Figure 4 shows a more realistic network topology that includes four machines. Two machines are 
database servers (Host 1 and 2), one web server (Host 3) and one desktop (Host 4). The list of 
vulnerabilities for each host is summarised in Table 1. The categories of vulnerabilities include 
Critical, High, Medium, Low and Information according to severity. For example, Host 1 has 14 




Inputs: G = (V, E, P, L), α is the population size, 
γ is the rate of crossover and µ is the rate of mutation. 
Output: BestSolution (High-risk attack paths). 
1.  ← Generate α feasible solutions 
2. Evaluate each individual ∈  
3. Initialise BestSolutions 
4. While stopping condition is not met 
5. Repeat until α is reached 
6. Select a pair parents from  
7. Apply crossover according to γ 
8. Apply mutation according to µ 
9. Evaluate offspring 
10. Add offspring to offspring population  
11. Update BestSolutions 
12. Replace current  with (   ) 
13. End while 
 
 

















Figure 4. Real-world network 
 
Table 1. Summary of number and types of vulnerabilities of each host 
 
Host Critical High Medium Low Info Total 
1 14 35 95 13 144 301 
2 14 33 89 11 126 273 
3 3 17 62 6 68 156 
4 0 0 4 1 32 37 
   
 
Figure 5. Summary in percentage of identified vulnerabilities 
 
Figure 5 shows another way to describe vulnerabilities in the network according to the categories.  
It is seen that the critical vulnerabilities are 5% of the total number of vulnerabilities. The high is 




Following the process described in Section 4, the attack graph is generated using MulVAL. The 
attack graph consists of 1682 vertices and 3183 edges. We have explored many different GA 
parameters to determine the best parameters that produce good solutions in short run times. Table 
2 lists results from some of the experiments performed to explore the average fitness and average 
run-time averaged over ten GA runs. It is seen that the average fitness results are similar but the 
average run-times differ widely. The highest average fitness is found with the population size 
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4500, the rate of crossover 0.95 and the rate of mutation 0.3. The average run time seems to 
increase as the population size increases because the GA takes more time to produce and process 
more individuals.  
 
Figure 6 shows the GA results with population size 500 and different crossover and mutation 
probabilities in bar charts. On the left side of Figure 6, the average fitness for the GA experiments 
seem to be similar. However, the left side shows the average run time in (ms) and indicates that 
the higher crossover rate 0.95 and mutation rate 0.5 took the largest run time over 10000 ms. 
Similarly, Figure 7 shows the GA results with population size 2000. 
 
Table 2. An extract of GA experimental results exploring the population size (PS), rate of crossover (Pc), 
rate of mutation (Pm), average fitness (AvgFit) and average time (ms) 
 
PS Pc Pm AvgFit AvgTime(ms) 
200 0.95 0.3 3312 3403 
500 0.95 0.001 3119 3565 
500 0.95 0.1 3320 6975 
500 0.95 0.3 3394 9161 
1000 0.8 0.001 3167 9314 
1000 0.8 0.1 3326 14884 
1000 0.8 0.3 3445 17976 
1000 0.95 0.3 3513 17069 
2000 0.95 0.001 3319 20436 
2000 0.95 0.1 3469 29433 
2000 0.95 0.3 3519 34785 
3000 0.8 0.001 3415 34734 
3000 0.95 0.001 3422 38316 
3000 0.95 0.1 3558 42103 
3000 0.95 0.3 3614 54686 
4000 0.95 0.3 3552 77797 
4500 0.95 0.3 3646 80908 
5000 0.95 0.3 3627 100896 
5500 0.95 0.3 3638 91219 
6000 0.95 0.3 3637 120671 
 







































































































Figure 7. GA results with population size 2000 




















Figure 8. GA results showing average fitness vs. population size 
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Figure 9. GA average run time (sec) for several population sizes 
 
Figure 8 presents average fitness with different population sizes. The bars show that the results 
are around 3500. Figure 9 shows the GA average run time in seconds for several population sizes.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper presents a risk assessment model based on attack graphs. The work demonstrates that 
attack graphs are very useful tools in risk assessment. More importantly, they can be used to 
quantitatively measure and explore the risk of networked systems. We develop a GA 
methodology to analyse attack graphs, compute risk values of attack paths and produce necessary 
risk information for networks. The GA approach makes it possible to handle very large attack 
graphs. Additionally it has the strong advantage that the GA generates populations of solutions 
from which the overall risk from a number of individual attack paths can be quantified. The 
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